LTTE’s Underwater Vehicle Factory Is captured……..

SLA, Task Force-3 found an LTTE underwater vehicle along with 3 other smaller underwater vehicles which are still under construction from the Udayarkattukulam area in Mullaittivu. Military sources said that this was the most startling recovery made by troops so far during the ongoing counter terrorist operations against the LTTE.

The largest underwater vehicle found is about 35 feet in length and amour plated. The discovery was made by the infantrymen of 4 Sri Lanka Light Infantry (4 SLLI) .

With this discovery the LTTE will go down in the history as the first terrorist organization to develop underwater weapons. Also, the LTTE is the first terrorist outfit to introduce suicide bombers to the world and to develop naval and air arms.

LTE has used FRP (Fibre Reinforced Plastic) Technology from a foreign country for these machines.The Army's Task Force 3 has obtained conclusive evidence of this technology. DR also received credible information from sources within the Navy that the Dvora blown-up recently off the coast of Mulaitivu was by a suicide submerged vessel, possibly a human torpedo/water scooter. It was said that tigers have carried out several attacks against the FAC’s of the NAVY using small human subs which now believed to be buit in this factory.

The most reason attack came against a Dvora FAC which was patrolling seas about 10 nautical miles off the coast of Mulaitivu when the blast occurred. Given the nature of the blast and the amount of explosives used and the distance from the coast to the FAC, a suicide frogman can be ruled out. A similar blast sunk a Navy Logistics supply Ship in the Trincomalee Naval Yard last year.

Also with this discovery few eye brows were raised among the high military ranks fearing that the LTTE leader VP might already used one of these vehicles to escape from the Navy defense lines in the Mullattivu Sea. While Lot of rumors are still spreading about the fate of the LTTE leader.

55 th 59 will meet soon to liberate all coastal area

The delay experienced in entering Mulaitivu was to avoid losses in open lagoon. By last evening, Mulaitivu was completely under seige from the south and east, except from the north. 59 and 55 Divisions, who were expecting to jointly take Mulaitivu could not do so as the 55 was held up by some resistance further north.

But the linkup between the 59 and the 55 is inevitable as the 55 marches beyond Chalai and finally reaches the Nanthikandal lagoon. With this, the two divisions will turn eastward now becoming the first divisions to do so in this war as the Commander's plan to get the Tigers boxed-in in the middle gradually becomes a reality.

One avenue of approach would march along the A-35 as the uncleared areas get sandwiched by the 58, 55, 59, TF 2, 3 and 4 while the 57 prepares to hold down and secure Kilinochchi to welcome the trapped civilians.

Mullativu Falls To SLA

SLA now has complete control of the Mullathivu town which had been under LTTE control for the last 13 years. SLA’s massive base complex in Mullathivu fell in July, 1996 when LTTE launched their first Unceasing Waves operation. An entire brigade (512) was wiped out from the military map. Nearly 1400 soldiers were killed. Only 66 soldiers including two officers were the only survivors. It was a massive defeat for any conventional army after the Vietnam war. Pro LTTE media claimed that they have lost only 332 carders in this entire operation.It was the first major victory for the LTTE.

However after 13 years the tables have turned. This time the LTTE carders are the ons who had to be on the receiving end. The first SLA units to enter Mullathivu town last morning were from the 59 division. A surprise attack was launched across the Nandikadal lagoon which flanked the LTTE dfence positions from the east forcing the tigers to flee.A number of LTTE cadres were killed in operations in and around Mullathivu town and bodies of 15 fallen tigers have been recovered by the army.

After laying siege to Mulaitivu from 3 different areas, the 59 Division finally entered Mulaitivu, a small island-like area across the Nanthikandal lagoon. The LTTE had started vacating the area prior to this. But the sources close to military revealed that small teams of LTTE carders are still trapped inside the town due to the surprise nature of the attack. Search and destroy operations are underway to find and destroy these teams.

What Is The Difference......

Some defense analysis given by several pro-LTTE media are still igniting hope for the LTTE's military campaign. One of the central points of this analysis was that LTTE hierarchy is allowing the spreading of SLDFs over larger area so that tigers can penetrate through a few weak points in the Army defenses. Unfortunately for the LTTE, this is highly unlikely to happen. Several reasons for this:

1. Unlike the previous Eelam wars, our battle planners are putting a lot of effort on "defense in depth".

2. The above has been facilitated by force multiplying effects of the SF units, MBRL-ARti units and the armor units.

3. LRRP units working in deep-enemy space (these units are now in the Mullativu jungles!). These do not allow the tigers to concentrate cadres for a major assault against us (SLAF, MBRL attacks can be called in by these units as well).

4. Several most coveted armored units (61,56) have not been unleashed as yet (Because of their high mobility and firepower, these units can effectively be used to cover a large open area); and also they can be used to breach the Tiger FDL by using techniques like attacking on a center of gravity. These units can also be made to do "thunder runs" into and out of the Mullativu area, unsettling the cats greatly.

5. Influx of newly trained divisions for both defensive and offensive roles.

6. force multiplier effect of the Navy and SLAF units.

7. Shrinking of the tiger FDL. This gives SLA a smaller effective area to cover.

EP is now Liberated what is next….???

Troops of SLA have liberated EP completely and after two years of bitter fighting, this war has come to a decisive phase. Stage is all set for the final battle to begin.

7 offensive elements of SLA are now threatening to sweep the Mulative jungle. They are namely (53, 58, 57, 59 divisions and task forces -2, 3, 4).A SLA division is normally consist of 7500 troops (3 brigades).A task force is consist of 5000 troops ( 2 brigades ).But there are exceptions as 57 division consist of 4 brigades, hence 10,000 troops. Also SLA hopes to raise the task force-5 and with that they hope to use more than 50,000 troops for the final battle.

These main divisions will surround Mullative jungle from 3 directions 53 fron the north, 58, 57 task force – 2 and 3 from the west, 59 and task force – 4 from the south. Meanwhile SBS and RABS special boat squadrons of SLN with FAC’s will guard the coast line from the east with their maximum strength.

Other than that 3 more entire divisions will act as supply and reserve units. After capturing the Jaffna peninsula completely, 55 th division is believed to be remain in EP providing reserves and resupply from the north while the 53 rd division goes on the offensive. 61 st division will do the same from the west and 56 th division from the south.

These units were established to continuously resupply the forward elements and for defend in depth tactics. Also to act as reserve units in case of a counter attack by the enemy to break the defense line.

Why EP is captured so easily

The National front or the 8 km defense line spanning from kilali to Nargakovil was the bloodiest battleground in the 4 th Eelam war both sides have suffered heavy damages in this field. It was revealed recently that more than 700 soldiers gave their lives and more than 2500 soldiers were injured in this battleground only. LTTE has also suffered heavy damages but SLA suffered more because they launched most of the offensives being in the open ground towards well fortified LTTE bunker lines. Also tigers used their Artillery and Mortar weapons effectively against the SLA who were in open grounds inflicting heavy damages.

But in the past few days both 53 and 55 divisions have made rapid advances towards the EP and captured it within few days. Only 20 soldiers have laid their lives and less than 100 soldiers were injured. The simple question of why it was happed so easily take us back to very basic military tactics which is “The continues flow of supplies to the forward elements are the main success in military victories.”This has proven time and again in many battles. It was the same reason that forces the LTTE to windrow completely from the Jaffna peninsula.

It all started with the Task force-1 capturing the Paranthan junction. Recently upgraded as the 58 th division they triggered a serious of victories to SLA liberating town after town. This move have isolated the LTTE in the EP as they couldn’t resupply ammunition, arti and mortar shells via land. Tigers had to rely on sea but it was fully guard by SLN with their maximum strength. Also they had to move their heavy weaponry (Artillery, Mortar etc) before they are further trapped and destroyed by SLA. Tigers value these weapons highly as they are the ones inflicting maximum damage to SLA in the 4 th eelam war.

So the tigers are now fleeing towards Mulative through the Chundikulam sanctuary where the final battle is about to be commenced.

TF 4 troops enter Oddusuddan town.

Troops of Task Force 4 who have continued their advances further northwards have entered Oddusuddan town by this afternoon.Troops entered the Oddusuddan town following the days long fighting ensued in the area.But LTTE offered litle resistance to SLA compared to the other towns as they are now more keen to protect Mulative after loosing Kilinochchi.

The strategically vital Oddusuddan junction located along the Mankulam - Mullaittivu (A34) main road had been used by the LTTE terrorists for their administrative and logistic purposes as it has direct route access towards Mullaittivu, Puthukkudiyiruppu, Mankulam and Nedunkeni.It is also a very popular name among the community in the south as it was one of the Last battlegrounds in the "Jayasikuru" Operation.

Troops own engaged in further consolidating operations in north and west of Oddusudan areas,as they are now controlling more than 90% of territory in the strategically important Mankulam,Mullative ( A-34) road.defence sources further said.

A Minor Explosion in pettah

There was a explosion in the "pettah redmosque" area about 4.50 PM this evening.A vehicle was exploded and 2 civilians have sustained injuries......

EP is about to be vacated by the LTTE

LTTE has started vacating Elephant Pass.With the fall of the strategically important paranthan junction,The supply lines to the Muhamalei is now cut off from the land.It is possible that the LTTE
is Moving their heavy weaponry(Howitzers mortars etc) to the more safer areas in wanni.Sources said that the forward elements of the 58 div(task force-1) is only 2 km's away from EP.
Available information is also pointing out that the 53,55 together with the mechanical Infantry men are getting ready for another show down in the upcoming days to keep up the pressure on the LTTE carders.

LTTE makes a Desparate attack

A LTTE suicide bomber has exploded in front of the Air Force camp in Slave Island , Colombo today evening killing 2 and injuring 36 people. According to the available information some of the injured are air force personnel but most of he others are civilians.

the suicide bomber has exploded in front of the entrance of the Air Force camp down the C.A. Gardiner road around 5.15PM.It is said that the bomber has exploded suddenly after he crossed the road.The target of the attack is sill unknown but believed to be carried out to divert the attention from the kilinochchi loss.

KILINOCHCHI IS ABOUT TO FALL

The LTTE capital Kilinochchi is now being left behind y the LTTE carders as troops from the 57,58 divisions converge on it from all sides. The Town is expected to fall completely into the hands of the Army within today and will b declared captured shortly.

This will be the biggest moral boosting victory for the SLA in the history of the wanni battle front although Kili doesn’t have any significant military value. (Like Punarin etc.)

This will be an series blow to the LTTE as VP mentioned several months ago that it will be a day dream of MR to capture Kili.This may lead the tamil Diaspora to lose faith about LTTE who are at the receiving end of this war at the moment.

RATHA REGIMENT WAS THWARTED FROM SLA 59 DIV

More than 30 Ratha Regiment elite Tigers were killed and many others were injured when they clashed with a Brigade from the 59 Division near the town of Oddusudan yesterday. 15 bodies of the elite cadres were recovered in the search operations afterwards.
This Brigade from the 59 has bypassed Oddusudan and is heading towards two LTTE airstrips situated to the South East and North West of Puthukudiirippu when they clashed with a tiger group who tried to break in to the defense line manned by the security forces. Heavy clashes were erupted and both sides were damaged, however finally the Ratha regiment carders were forced to retreat with heavy casualties.

Ratha regiment is a Special Forces group of LTTE tigers who are well trained for deep penetration (LRRP) missions like the SF (Special Forces) for SLA. This group is believed to be directly under he guidance of “ Rathnam Master “ who is the new military intelligence leader for LTTE.A group of this same regiment was surrounded and killed in konwewa(Padaviya)when they tried to penetrate in to the eastern province. Ratha regiment leader and his second in command were also killed several months back by the SLA LRRP 8 man teams from the 3 rd SF regiment.

TF 1 captures Karadipokku junction - Kilinochchi

Victorious troops of Task Force 1 after liberating paranthan, now on aggressive advances towards the heart of Kilinochchi from the A-9 highway have reported another victory against LTTE terrorists by gaining control over the Karadipokku junction located between Paranthan and Kilinochchi along the A-9 main road.

The Karadipokku junction is the northern edge of the Kilinochchi uil up area and troops continued their advance from Paranthan to Kilinochchi captured this strategically vital place giving early signs of fall of Kilinochchi. Sources also confirmed that an LTTE's support group commander, known as Ilamperiyan, who commanded the Paranthan battle was also killed in fierce fighting ensued to capture the paranthan junction.

According to the latest information the LTTE's well-famous "93 Base", the main command and administrative centre of LTTE female cadres, is also now under army's control.

FIGHTING IN THE BOTTLENECK NATIONAL FRONT

The most common question that throws in to the defense analysts these days is why it s so difficult for the army to move ahead from the national front (Forward defense line From Kilali to Nargalkovil).When the SLA is making significant advances in the wanni battle front.

There are several reasons behind this. But above all the major disadvantage for the SLA here is the situation of the land which is very favorable to LTTE.

The national front defense line is a narrow 8 Km Bunker line stretching from Kilali to Nargarkovil(Shown in the picture) connecting the Jaffna peninsula to the main land. This is also an open where even a rabbit can be spotted for many miles.

For the SLA two fighting divisions namely 53 rd and 55 th are operating in this front. That means about 15,000 SLA troopers are waiting in there jumping off positions ready for action. From these to 53 rd is the oldest and the most experienced division in the wanni battlefront today. It was the only reserve division that the SLA had when the present military commander took over. And there is also a mechanical Infantry regiment.

According the Intelligent reports, the no of LTTE tiger’s guarding the heavily fortified bunker line is between 1000-1500.But most of them are experienced hardcore cadres. The strategy of the LTTE is that the less experienced carders manning the bunker line while the more experience carders act as reserve. In this way they can stand up to military advances while preserving their experienced carders.

In the Beginning of this ongoing wanni operation, Tigers had to defend to defense lines.One is the 8 km narrow national front. The other is the 108 km wanni FDL ranging from Kokkuthduwai lagoon to Mannar. LTTE could not hold on to the longer FDL due to the man power shortage and the SLA is making rapid advance to the heart of wanni.

But even outnumbered (nearly 10 to 1), the tigers are still holding onto the other FDL using the advantage of the bottleneck shaped terrain. Due to this disadvantage the SLA can’t outflank the enemy from either side. Which was a tactic significantly used in the wanni battlefront. (The same tactic was used in the true story which was used to create the film 300).The SLA has tried to breach the enemy defensive line several times with had on clashes, But was forced to retreat with heavy casualties. Because of the open terrain, the effectiveness of the mortar and artillery are quite high which tigers use quite effectively nowadays.

But all these resistance won’t last forever. The huge manpower of the SLA will melt down the LTTE defense formations slowly but surely. Only time will tell when it is going to happen.

WANNI BATTLEFRONT IS INTO THE NEXT GEAR

The tempo of the wanni battlefront has been increased significantly during the last couple of weeks resulting heavy damages to both sides. The battleground is warming up since the SLA is now closing on the main LTTE fortresses Kili and Mulattiv.

SLA could have easily played waiting game(Cut supplies down and slowly taking over)like they did on Nachchikuda,Madu etc. But now decided to go for an all out offensive to capture kili and Mulattive. This approach is easily visible from the increasing number of air raids per a day.

This all out offensive method reveals several important intentions of SLA.

1 – To discourage tamil Diaspora who donate for LTTE all over the world.(Prabakaran said it will be a day dream of Mahinda Rajapaksha to capture kili. If SLA manages to capture kili, then Diaspora will lose faith on LTTE)

2 – As a diversionary attack (To pin down tiger defensive formations only to two places. When LTTE is doing an all out effort to defend these towns and concentrating more here, SLA could go ahead from else ware.)

3 – Destroying the elite tiger units like Charles Anthoney, Imran pandyan etc by forcing them to do a set piece battle with SLA where the superior firepower of the SLA can take the upper hand. And by doing that prompting the other carders of LTTE to give up on there mission.

This all out offensive method can e an expensive exercise, But it may produce results faster than anyone would imagine.

LTTE suicide bomb blast near Catholic Church ; 8 killed, 17 injured - Wattala

LTTE terrorists have carried out a suicide bomb attack near the sacred St Anne's church, Hekitta, Wattla in the north of Sri Lankan capital this morning (Dec 28). According to police sources, a male suicide bomber has exploded himself around 9 AM in front of the Civil Defense Force office on the church road.

Eight people have been killed and 17 others suffered injuries in the attack. An Army officer and 6 other CDF personnel were among those killed in the bomb blast. 13 CDF personnel and 4 civilians including women were reported injured due to the bomb blast.

The injured have been admitted to Teaching Hospital, Ragama and National Hospital, Colombo. Sources in the Ragama hospital said that 2 of the 10 injured admitted to the hospital are in serious condition. Later, a CDF guard and a civilian who were among injured admitted to the National Hospital, Colombo had succumbed to injuries.

According to eyewitnesses, the suicide bomber had exploded himself when he was stopped by the security personnel on guard from entering the CDF office.

For A Tamil Eelam..(if ever happens)

We wish to examine the concept of Tamil Eelam within the hypothesis that it will eventually exist in Sri Lanka for the purpose of testing the hypothesis of Eelam in practical terms. Three issues that can potentially delimit this hypothesis are presented below. The proposed Tamil Ealam of the LTTE will be analysed through its existing as well as future system of governance, economy and the security dilemma.

The Tamil Eelam Government

The current system of governance in areas under LTTE is dictatorial. Dictatorial states have certain inherent problems. These include but are not limited to a lack of international acceptance, rights abuses, corruption, suppression of the public, disgruntled communities, rebellion etc. If a state of Tamil Eelam were to be established, the present Tamil leadership under Pripaharan would have to change or they would have to be removed. Exactly who in the Tamil community that can remove them from power is a concern? If they cannot be removed, a parliamentary democracy is out of the question. In the post 9/11 world, this is tantamount to state failure at the highest level and justifies intervention (i.e. Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba). The Tamil Eelam administration would also have to share power with minority Muslims living in Jaffna, Mannar, Kilinochchi etc.

The other issue with Governing Tamil Eelam would be the new Tamil elites motivated by their own personal interests, rather than the interests of Tamil Eelam. These elites could be political leaders, former military leaders of LTTE, old and new economic leaders (businessmen) etc.

The Tamil Eelam Economy

The current economy of LTTE areas has two characteristics. The first characteristic is the remnants of the Sri Lankan Economy managed by the Government of Sri Lanka. This accounts for much of the economic activities in terms of import and export trade (As with the national economy regulated via Colombo and Trincomalee harbours), payments (salaries) to public sector service providers and state-appointed Administrators (i.e. GAs, AGAs to school teachers), development projects and schemes to which the state is a fiscal agent (i.e. renovation of A-9 Highway) and Subsidies (i.e. food stamps, rations etc). The state does not receive taxes from establishments in areas with an LTTE presence and therefore is giving voluntarily at this point in time.

The second characteristic is the Gift Economy where some members of Tamil Diaspora fund the LTTE. Some trickling-down of this money occurs when LTTE attempts to operate a symbolic civil administration, police unit etc. However, Diaspora funding has its limits. New generations of Tamils born and bred outside of Sri Lanka may not have an interest in sustaining the conflict.

The third aspect of the present Tamil Eelam economy is the indirect economic benefits provided through activities of Non-Governmental Organizations (i.e. UNICEF grant to rehabilitate child combatants). This economy might disappear along with international funding in the event the problem of the Tamils is solved, as proposed by the LTTE, through Tamil Eelam.

In the event Tamil Eelam is established and the Sri Lankan state withdraws, the Diaspora funded Gift Economy would have to increase its role as a military as well as a civil funding agency and replace the state economy. Establishment of Eelam would also prevent fundraising from foreign public entities based on sympathy for the Tamil cause. It would also prevent the State of Eelam from raising money through illegal means such as money-laundering, weapons, drugs and human smuggling etc due to increased scrutiny and accountability.

The Security Dilemma

As long as there is a Sri Lankan Government, a military and an economy, Eelam will not rest in peace. Any disgruntled groups living in Tamil Eelam would have to be eliminated or else risk being manipulated by the Sri Lanka government. Eelam would also have to guard itself against neighboring India for obvious reasons. Eventually, hardline leaders from the Sinhala community in the south will outbid and outflank moderates based on a campaign for war against the state of Eelam, which they will consider a threat to national security. Political leaders might even lose to charismatic military leaders seeking a military takeover of government for the purpose of destroying Eelam. This could result in war, of the likes never before seen by any Sri Lankan.

All in all, the stakes of maintaining Eelam seem higher that winning it. If the cost of achieving Eelam is higher than rejecting Eelam and settling for a lesser goal, then it is the option that one can choose. Good governance, managing a national economy and safeguarding national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state of Tamil eelam can be much harder than waging guerilla warfare.

The Principles of War

"You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war." - Napoleon Bonaparte

Military theoreticians have long established some fundamental principles of war, which have remained unchanged for several thousand years. These principles are incorporated into modern warfare as the art of war became the science of war. The Principles of War (1) and the adherence to it by the Army and LTTE can be analyzed as follows;

• Objective- Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. As Clausewitz pointed out “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war.” Although an unconventional army, the LTTE has maintained a clear objective in mind (Eelam- a politico-military objective). The Sri Lanka Army has a new military objective under General Fonseka. It is now upto the politicians to create a political objective better than Eelam.
• Offensive- Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Until 2005, the LTTE dominated offensive actions, which role is now being replaced by the Army.
• Mass- Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. The LTTE’s Oyatha Alaikal/ Ceaseless Waves are a good example of this strategy. However, not a single Ceaseless Wave was launched recently. The Army has its own force concentrations. However, these concentrated forces are rarely deployed in mass, thus eliminating high casualty rates unlike Agnikeela and Muhamalai debacles. The modus operandi of the new Mechanized Infantry Regiment is yet unclear, but furthers the application of this principle by the SLA.
• Economy of force- Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. The Army’s adherence to this principle is currently being tested by the LTTE through attacks in the south. The Army is also testing the LTTE in the same area through LRRP operations.
• Maneuver- Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. Both sides apply this principle against each other by attempting to off balance each other by posing new problems and new dangers faster than a side can deal with them.
• Unity of command- For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. This is a highly politicized issue in a three forces command. Rebel forces are monolithic and have better success at assigning the right responsibilities to the right command. LTTE commanders are given objectives to achieve and the rank and file must comply, or pay with their lives. Recently, the Army has instilled a greater sense of responsibility and accountability to the command. Recent appointments, promotions, demotions and transfers were based on merit and not on seniority or political allegiance.
• Security- Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. The LTTE has been at the receiving end of this principle lately, with the loss of weapons ships, ‘Col. Charles’, Thamilselvan etc. The military too suffered (i.e. Anuradhapura attack), but less in terms of loses suffered in 1996-2002.
• Surprise- Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. This is the LTTE’s forte and it hasn’t failed them yet. The Sri Lankan military has also improved in this area through surprise attacks on Tiger leadership and assets.
• Simplicity- Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Again, the rebels hold the advantage. No PowerPoint presentations required in briefing LTTE leaders or rank and file. The SLA has also recently transformed. The language of communication at all levels of the command shifted from English to ‘layman’ Sinhala. The present Commander of the Army and the Defence Secretary played a role in this and also in separating political plans from military plans.

(Courtesy of DW)

Suicide Boats: A Force Multiplier in Unconventional Warfare

1. The USS Cole bombing

2. The USS Cole, carried to the US.

The LTTE are the only guerilla organization with a naval capability in the world today. The Palestinians during their heyday in Lebanon had a small naval contingent mostly for infiltration and they too carried out a couple of suicide attacks using boats, with little success. Al-Qaeda executed a successful suicide mission on USS Cole in Yemen. The Sea Tigers evolved from the time honored tradition that existed of smuggling contraband from Sri Lanka to India and illegal immigrants.

Black Sea Tiger suicide boats operate in small numbers–taking cover amongst large numbers of fishing craft, or with other Sea Tiger craft or in a ‘pack’ of suicide boats with or without other Sea Tiger craft. They have been most effective when they operate as a flotilla of mixed craft – fast attack craft and suicide boats. They are used for Force Multiplication purposes in the Sea and also as deterrence. Many large Sea Tiger crafts like the Muraj often evade engaging the Powerful Dvora FAC/FPC MK. II and keep their distance, allowing small boats to take on the attack/pursuit. The Muraj usually acts as a Command Ship. The Idian fiberglass beat has a stealth-like design with possible iron-ball paint to reduce radar detection. They usually have detonation cones at the front. To keep the navy guessing, Sea Tigers camouflage their stealth boats as fishing boats and change the number of passengers/suicide cadres. They are also known to use disabled persons as suicide bombers at sea. Despite these tactics, Navy FACs has managed to evade a large number of these attacks. But some have fallen prey to cunning Sea Tiger tactics like the use of suicide fishing boats.

Picture 1 and 2 shows the result of the suicide attack on the U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) on October 12, 2000. Suicide boats are effective for attacking large slow-moving ships especially near docks. Sri Lanka Navy does not have large warships like the US but have Offshore Patrol Vessels and Fast Missile Cruisers that could become prime targets. The Jetliner fast transport ship is another target, which, to date, has evaded several Sea Tiger attacks due to its high speed.

The Sea Tigers: An Independent Analysis

Main Sea Tiger Vessels

Name	crew	Max Speed (knot)	Armament	Remark
Muraj (Fast Attack Craft)	10	45	3 machine guns (2x 23mm)	Surface search radars are being standardized on some versions. Equipped with portable SAM unit. Cargo capacity to carry 12 petrol barrels. It is also faster than the SL Navy Super Dvora MK II boats
Thrikka	4	45	1 machine gun (Cal 50)	Used by frogmen for debussing.
Sudai	6	10	1 machine gun (Cal 50)	Used for attacks against naval craft.
Idayan	2	45	None	Jet boat, such as a civilian type. 200 horsepower outboard engines.
Stealth (unknown)		35 (?)	None	First seen in LTTE video footage. Just a stealthy design or an Exotic type of 2 seated boat.

Sea Tigers Equipment

Classification	Type / Quantity	Remark
Patrol Vessels	Israeli made Dvora MK-I FPC (50 tons) Russian made Mirage Class Boat (120 tons)	The Sea Tigers’ precious vessels.
Freighters	GPS/Radar equipped	Due to the SL navy’s surveillance, transporting operations are pretty limited. Even the Tamil tigers do not have a possible anchorage harbor for unloading.
Midget Submarine	Custom made, equipped with Sonar	Unidentified. Specifications unknown. Made of FRP. Limited underwater capability.
Small Boats	High-Speed Water Jet ‘Stealth design’ Boat 2-Seater FRP Boats	Those small boats are a core power of the Sea Tigers for their suicide mission.
Auxiliary equipments	Frogman Kits Air Compressors Underwater Scooters Human Torpedo Units	Human torpedo units are unidentified. Probably based on Japanese KAITEN in WWII.